Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can help hold the government to account, it may also give incumbents an incentive to "…x the evidence" around their preferred policy. This paper studies how di¤erent disclosure rules and the degree of independence of government agencies a¤ect citizen welfare when manipulation incentives are present. When both instruments can be chosen to maximize citizen welfare, secrecy is never socially optimal because its chief advantage-unbiased information-can more e¢ ciently be achieved by insulating the agency from political pressure. And yet granting independence to the agency is not necessarily in the citizens'interest. For given evidence, in fact, biased information makes the government more reluctant to implement its ex ante preferred policy, thus mitigating the agency con ‡ict between the government and the public. The model therefore provides a novel rationale for the optimality of nonindependent agencies.
Introduction
Timely and accurate information about what o¢ ce holders are doing is essential to keep policymakers on their toes and yet in most countries deviations from the principle of open government are commonplace. In the United States, for instance, the President has the right to withhold information from Congress and the courts, typically on the grounds that he needs candid and con…dential advice from his sta¤. Even those countries that have adopted Freedom of Information laws limit their applicability in certain areas, most notably to protect internal decision-making, personal privacy and national security (Banisar, 2004; Roberts, 2006) . This paper studies how political institutions, and in particular disclosure rules, should be designed when internal communications can be manipulated. We consider a simple model where a government receives information from a government agency and must then choose whether or not to implement a policy. Examples include an intelligence agency providing information about the opportunity to wage war against another country, or the assessment of an environmental agency about the likely impact of building a new nuclear plant. As standard in political agency models, we assume that the preferences of the government and those of the public are not perfectly aligned but the government wants to be perceived as taking the 'right'decision by the public (an 'electoral concern'). Thus, while policymakers may be more willing to wage war than voters, they nevertheless are responsive to public opinion.
The key assumptions we make are that the process of information gathering and evaluation can be systematically distorted and that these manipulations lead to a loss of useful information. We consider two polar scenarios: one where the agency is independent of government and another where the agency is nonindependent. If the agency is independent (and therefore not subject to political pressure), its report is unbiased. As such, all parties with access to its contents are better informed about the appropriate course of action. However, if the agency is not independent, this report may be biased in favor of the policy the government ex ante prefers. In that case, we assume that the degree of bias is chosen by the government to maximize its own welfare. For instance, the government may (optimally) sta¤ the agency with individuals who are prone to stating a case for war, seek the advice of biased experts, or encourage biased information gathering and evaluation.
The drawback is that all the parties with access to the report (including the government)
will receive lower quality information. Thus, sta¢ ng the agency with 'yes-men'will result in poor decision-making. 1 We use this framework to address two questions, both from the voter's perspective.
First, should the contents of the report be made public? And second, should the agency be made independent of the government? Both issues are of great practical importance.
It is often claimed that secrecy is instrumental in protecting the integrity of the decisionmaking process and indeed as we noted above one of the most common exemptions to the principle of open government in practice is the exemption of pre-decision information.
Granting independence to government agencies is also becoming increasingly common.
The Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. and the Bank of England, for instance, have a status that ensures their independence from political pressure by limiting the removal of their heads to certain causes. The British commission in charge of investigating recent episodes of intelligence failure also recommended to strengthen the independence of the Joint Intelligence Committee, although it fell well short of recommending full independence from the executive (Butler Report, 2004, pp. 143-144) .
The analysis of the model yields several interesting results. In line with conventional wisdom, we …nd that a policy of full disclosure ('transparency') makes the government more accountable and hence more responsive to public desires, relative to a nondisclosure scenario. However, disclosure also induces policymakers to distort the process of information gathering and evaluation, thus compromising the quality of the decision-making process. By contrast, when no information can be disclosed ('secrecy'), the government has no incentive to manipulate the information. Secrecy is e¤ective at protecting the integrity of the decision-making process.
The most surprising results emerge when both the disclosure policy and the degree of 1 A nice illustration is provided by the case of Curve Ball discussed in Section 2.
independence of the government agency are chosen to maximize citizen welfare. We show that secrecy is never in the citizens'interest and that it can be socially optimal for the government agency not to be independent. Secrecy is always dominated by transparency because its chief advantage-unbiased information-can more e¢ ciently be achieved by insulating the agency from political pressure. And yet granting independence to the agency is not necessarily socially optimal. Manipulations have in fact two e¤ects. On the one hand, biased information hurts voters because it increases the chances of the wrong decision being taken. On the other hand, since the government also cares about mistakes, its optimal decision rule is a¤ected by the (optimally chosen) bias in information. We show that a pro-implementation bias in information has in general a moderating e¤ect on policy:
For given evidence, it always makes the government less willing to implement the project.
Thus biased information helps mitigate the agency con ‡ict between the government and the public. We provide examples where this moderating e¤ect of bias more than compensate voters for the increased chance of mistakes. A necessary condition is that electoral concerns are weak, suggesting that the bene…ts of having a independent bureaucracy may be greater in more mature democracies.
The possibility that the "politicization" of information may have a bright side appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature. Existing work on bureaucratic behavior has focused mainly on two drawbacks of independence, namely that it could make public o¢ -cials less responsive to public desires (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 2004) or too insulated from top decision-makers (Betts, 2004) . A key contribution of the present paper is therefore to highlight a novel drawback of bureaucratic independence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 reviews related literature.
Section 2 motivates the analysis by discussing the risks of manipulation of information associated with the adoption of open government laws and performance targets for the public sector (recent episodes of intelligence failures are also discussed). Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 analyzes the case where the report must be made public ('transparency') and the government agency is not independent. We consider both the case where the agency's bias is observable and the case where it is not observable. All the main results are shown to be robust to the presence of this type of uncertainty. Section 5 deals with the case where the government commits not to disclose any information ('secrecy'). Section 6 allows both the disclosure rule and the independence of the government agency to be endogenously determined and characterizes the choice of an optimal constitution from the citizens'viewpoint. Section 7 considers the case where the government cannot commit to any disclosure rule (i.e., disclosure is voluntary). Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a vast literature on accountability in government. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) study how separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies can foster accountability. Besley and Burgess (2002) show both theoretically and empirically that governments tend to be more responsive to citizens'needs where the media is more developed. Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) consider an environment where incumbents attempt to signal competence to voters by taking certain actions.
Depending on the probability of uncertainty resolution and on the quality of the challenger, three types of behavior can arise: leadership (where the incumbent enacts a policy that is in the public interest), pandering (where the incumbent enacts a policy that is contrary to the public interest but popular) and fake leadership (where the incumbent enacts a policy that is both contrary to the public interest and unpopular). Maskin and Tirole (2004) develop a model where elections allow the public to screen and discipline public o¢ cials but may also induce them to pander to public opinion. They study whether decision-making powers should be allocated to accountable o¢ cials ('politicians'), to nonaccountable o¢ -cials ('judges'), or to the public directly ("direct democracy"). The key di¤erence between the present paper and Canes-Wrone et al. and Maskin and Tirole is that in their models the public o¢ cials' private information cannot be credibly transmitted to voters. Thus issues of manipulation of information, transparency and bureaucratic independence do not arise in their models.
More closely related to the present work is Besley and Prat (2006) . They study a model of political accountability where incumbents can manipulate the transmission of information to the public by o¤ering some form of compensation to the media owners.
However, these is no policy decision-making in their model: bad politicians just want to hide their type. Their focus is on how features of the media industry such as concentration and ownership a¤ect political outcomes. By contrast, we focus on the impact of di¤er-ent disclosure rules and bureaucratic independence on the quality of the decision-making process, as well as political accountability.
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This paper also contributes to a literature focusing on transparency in agency relationships (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979 Holmstrom, , 1999 Cremer, 1995 and Prat, 2005) . Prat (2005) in particular develops a model of career concerns for experts where a principal may observe an agent's action and/or the consequences of that action. He shows that transparency on action may induce the agent to disregard useful private information and act in a conformist manner. As a result, the principal may be better o¤ by committing not to observe the action. By contrast, transparency on consequences is always bene…cial to the principal.
We focus neither on transparency on action nor on consequences. In this model transparency measures the extent to which pre-decision information is shared between the agent and the principal. Actions are observable but their long-term consequences are not (these are reasonable assumptions in politics and could be relaxed). The key issue is not whether transparency induces conformism on the part of the agent, but whether an agent would distort his own information (and possibly the principal's) to in ‡uence how the principal perceives his action.
3 In contrast to Prat, in fact, there is no 'smart'action in this model (a smart action being the one that an able agent is expected to choose a priori). Here the public supports the government if the chosen policy is believed to match the true state of the world. This can be accomplished in two ways. One is to select the policy that in the light of the best available evidence is more likely to be optimal from the public's viewpoint.
The dysfunctional alternative we highlight is to choose an a priori favored policy and then to "…x the evidence" around it.
Examples
In this section we brie ‡y discuss a number of real-world examples that motivate the analysis of this paper.
Open Government Laws. Banisar (2004) reports that in 2004 over …fty countries, including the US and most EU members, had adopted Freedom of Information (FOI) laws and over thirty more had pending e¤orts. However, this move toward greater transparency 2 Less directly related is the work of Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997), Milbourn, Shockley and Thakor (2001) and Suurmond, Swank and Visser (2004) . These authors study how reputational concerns a¤ect the incentives to implement projects and invest in information.
3 Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) also look at the issue of manipulation of information in agency but the focus of their analysis is very di¤erent.
has been accompanied by concerns that opening government to public scrutiny might compromise the quality of decision-making. Stasavage (2006, p. 15) , for instance, notes that " [t] he Economic and Financial Committee is characterized by frank exchanges of views about economic policy, precisely because it is a more insulated setting than is ECOFIN, the Council of Ministers of Finance". FOI experts have also highlighted several bureaucratic practices, including changes in recordkeeping, decline in candor, manipulation and failure to create records, that might be used to undercut the right to information (see Roberts, 2006) . As those practices might impair decision-making, most FOI laws provide some form of protection for the exchange of views that takes place within government. Typically, such protection is granted by exempting pre-decision information from the law, although the degree to which pre-decision material is protected varies considerably across countries (Frankel, 2001 ).
Targets and Government Figures. A distinctive feature of British politics under
New Labour is the proliferation of performance targets for the public sector. The aim of such targets is to provide a benchmark against which public sector output can be measured. However, a potential problem is that once the credibility of a government is tied to o¢ cial …gures, the pressure to produce favorable statistics may become irresistible.
This may help explain why a recent survey by the O¢ ce for National Statistics in Britain found that the majority of respondents believed o¢ cial …gures were changed to support a particular argument (68%), that there was political interference in their production (58%), and that mistakes were suppressed (69%) (Jones and Jones, 2005) . These concerns appear to be well-founded. Regarding the high-pro…le waiting-time target for hospitals in the UK, for instance, only 26% of accident and emergency (A&E) departments thought the …gures they submitted were a true re ‡ection of their performance, and 16% reported direct manipulation of data (British Medical Association, 2005) . Finally, it should be noted that biased statistics can have an adverse e¤ect on decision-making. Indeed, as emphasized by the Statistics Commission (2005, p. 7), trust in o¢ cial statistics must be preserved since they "in ‡uence large numbers of 'business'decisions day-to-day, across government, the public services and in the private and not-for-pro…t sectors".
Intelligence Failures. The last few years have witnessed an explosion of interest in the workings of the intelligence community. One reason has been that many of the claims that were used by the American and British administrations to justify the use of force in Iraq were based on faulty intelligence. While a number of explanations for such failures exists, many believe that in the case of Iraq intelligence assessments might have been warped by inappropriate political pressure to build a case for war. Policymakers were clearly aware of the role of intelligence in shaping public opinion. Referring to JIC dossier of September 2002, for instance, Lord Butler writes that "The Government wanted an unclassi…ed document on which it could draw in its advocacy of its policy" (p. 154, emphasis in original). There also seems to be "a good deal to suggest that the [American] administration employed strategies to mould the intelligence to its purposes" (The Economist, 17/07/04, p.25). For instance, it appears that some senior intelligence analysts suppressed potentially useful information to please their superiors. 4 The WMD Commission also found that "the analysts who raised concerns about the need for reassessments were not rewarded for having done so but were instead forced to leave WINPAC" (p.193) . Clearly this biased information-gathering process may have contributed to poor decision-making. 
The Model
Preferences. There are two players, the government (or policymakers) and the public (citizens, voters, etc.) . The government …rst gathers information through a government agency and then decides whether or not to implement a project. Let p 2 fw; ng denote the government's chosen policy, where w stands for implementation and n denotes the status quo. The public observes p and any disclosed information and then chooses which policy v 2 fw; ng to support. The public's choice is made before any outcome is observed.
The payo¤s of the government and the public depend on the true state of the world, S 2 fW; N g, which is initially unknown (for simplicity, the two states are assumed to be a priori equally likely). The public wants the policy to match the true state of the world. 4 The case of Curve Ball, an informant whose fabrications constituted most of the US intelligence on Iraq's mobile biological weapons program, provides a good case in point. Concerns about the reliability of Curve Ball were soon raised by a CIA o¢ cial. However, these concerns were quickly dismissed by the Deputy Chief of the CIA's Iraqi Task Force. Indeed, he told the o¢ cial to "keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say, and that the Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about" (Extract from an e-mail provided to the WMD Commission, p. 249).
5 See Garicano and Posner (2006) for an insightful analysis of the organizational issues involved in intelligence gathering and processing. Prendergast (1993) provides a theoretical analysis of the 'yes-man' phenomenon.
For instance, the public may want the government to build a new nuclear plant if the plant is 'reasonably'safe and cost-e¤ective, but not otherwise. Formally, the public is assumed to incur a loss of C w if the project is implemented and the true state is N , and a loss of C n if the project is not implemented and the true state is W . The public's payo¤ when the government policy matches the true state of the world is normalized to zero. With no loss of generality C w and C n are normalized so that C w + C n = 1.
Citizens support the policy that maximizes their expected utility given the information they possess. Let P denote the public's posterior belief that S = W . (The information structure of the game is discussed later.) Citizens support implementation if
that is, if implementation is likely to be the correct policy and the cost of wrong implementation is low (for now, we arbitrarily break ties in favor of w). Of course, citizens will support the status quo if P < T P .
The preferences of the government are more complex. Realistically, the government cares about citizen welfare (a 'legacy' concern). However, the government also enjoys a private bene…t B 0 when the project is implemented. This creates a potential con ‡ict of interest between the government and the public. Finally, to capture the disciplining e¤ect of public opinion, the government incurs a loss E 0 whenever its chosen policy is not supported by the public. Di¤erent interpretations can be attached to this cost. The most straightforward one is in terms of reelection concerns: If a government adopts an unpopular policy, citizens may vote for the opposition in the next election. However, E could measure other costs that a loss of popularity brings about: public vili…cation by the press, reduced job opportunities in the private sector, and so forth. The notion of "public"
should also be interpreted broadly. The model could apply for instance to scenarios where a country wants to convince other nations that a particular course of action is justi…ed to receive logistic or military support. Here E would measure the loss to that country should support be denied.
We formalize these di¤erent motives as follows. Let Gov denote the government's belief that S = W . Let 1 fp;vg be an indicator function taking value 1 if the government policy is not supported by the public (p 6 = v), and 0 otherwise. The government implements the project if
Thus as before the project is implemented when the probability that W is the true state is su¢ ciently high and C w is low. Relative to (3.1), however, the government's threshold tends to be lower (and the decision more biased toward implementation) because of the private bene…t B. Moreover, the government also tends to choose whichever policy happens to be 'popular'.
An important special case is when the government and the public share the same beliefs.
Lemma 1. Suppose Gov = P . If the public supports implementation, then the government always selects that action. If the public does not support implementation, then the government will select that action if and only if Gov T Gov C w B + E.
The intuition for this result is simple. Since the government is more disposed toward the project than the public is and they share the same information, if there is enough evidence to convince the public that implementation is the correct action, then there is also enough evidence to convince the government. The opposite is of course not necessarily true, because of the private bene…t B. Finally, the government will be less likely to select an unpopular policy if electoral concerns E are large, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 2. If the parties share the same information and E B , the government will always choose the policy that the public supports.
Information Structure. Before taking a decision, the government receives a report from a government agency. This report is composed of two signals, s i 2 f ; ?g ; i = 1; 2. ; 1) measures the precision of the signal. 6 We need two signals because we want to allow for situations where the evidence is "mixed".
If the agency is not independent of government, the signal-generating process can be distorted. Let s q = fs q 1 ; s q 2 g be the report produced by a nonindependent agency whose bias is q. We capture the idea of asymmetric vetting by assuming that with probability q 2 [0; 1] a genuine ? signal is transformed into fake signal. That is, the nonindependent agency garbles the signal-generating process so that Pr(s q i = j s G i = ?) = q (and forgeries are independent across signals). By contrast, the probability that a genuine signal is transformed into a fake ? signal is zero: Pr(s
Thus q measures in a simple way the agency's bias in favor of the government's initial disposition. Note that the independent agency scenario is a special case of the nonindependent agency case when q = 0. For this reason we will focus mainly on the nonindependent agency case, using however the superscript G instead of 0 to highlight the benchmark case of unbiased information.
If the agency is nonindependent, we posit that the bias q can be chosen by the government to maximize its own welfare, for instance by sta¢ ng the agency with the 'right' kind of bureaucrats. The drawback for the government (and any other party with access to the report of the agency) is that useful information may be lost. We capture this idea by assuming that the government can only observe the biased signals s q , not the genuine ones, unless of course q = 0. Thus, if the government discloses a signal , it might be reporting forged information, but it would not be telling a lie. In this sense we say that disclosure is 'truthful'. 7 Finally, we make some assumptions about the payo¤s. Let ( ; ) q be a shorthand for s q = ( ; ). Upon observing s q , the government and any other party with access to that information will update their beliefs about the true state of the world. Three beliefs need to be de…ned:
Pr(W j(?; ?) q ), corresponding to the three possible scenarios that can arise: (i) the report backs implementation (s q = ( ; )), (ii) the report is mixed (s q = ( ; ?) or (?; )) and (iii) the report opposes implementation (s q = (?; ?)).
8 Throughout the paper we will 7 It should be noted that here the public does not penalize the government just for manipulating the information. One reason could be that the government is able to de ‡ect this kind of criticism toward the government agency. At any rate, this assumption can easily be relaxed without changing the qualitative results of the paper, for instance by adding an 'electoral cost of manipulations'C (q) to the government's payo¤ function derived below.
8 Note that rational agents will discount signals more heavily than ? signals since the former might have been forged: q 1 2 . Furthermore, this e¤ect becomes more pronounced as the bias in information grows: @ q + =@q; @ q =@q < 0.
always assume that
Assumption 1 states that, although the public does not support implementation when the report is mixed, it might be swayed by su¢ ciently compelling evidence. Assumption 2 can be interpreted as a weak form of congruency between the government and the public.
It says that even without the disciplining e¤ect of public opinion, the government will choose not to implement the project when both signals are negative (s G = (?; ?) G ).
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Thus, in the absence of manipulations, the preferences of the government and the public only di¤er when the evidence is mixed. This feature of the model motivates the following de…nition. We say that the government is disciplined by public opinion if, for given q, it implements the project if and only if the report strongly backs implementation (i.e., s q = ( ; )). Conversely, we say that the government is not disciplined by public opinion if it implements the project also when the report is mixed.
Transparency
We begin with a setting where the government agency's report must be truthfully disclosed ('transparency') and the agency is nonindependent. For now we assume that the size of the bias q is observed by the public. This could be because not only the report but also the identity of the bureaucrats/experts (and hence their reputations) are disclosed. The case when q is not observable is studied later.
If the government and the public observe the same signals and q is observable, they will share the same posterior beliefs. Let (p; v j S) denote the government's payo¤ when the policy is p, the public supports v and the state is S. For given q 2 [0; 1], the government's expected payo¤ is
(4.1) 9 Since q = G for all q, we will simply write instead of q henceforth. 10 We will often refer to ( ; ) as positive signals and to (?; ?) as negative signals, irrespective of q. ( ; ?) and (?; ) will be called mixed signals.
where p(s q ) and v(s q ) denote, respectively, the policy chosen by the government and the policy supported by the public as a function of the report s q . Note that the public can condition its choice on s q because the report is disclosed. This will no longer be true in the nondisclosure ('secrecy') scenario. Our …rst result is the following.
Proposition 1. It is never optimal for the government to manipulate the information so much that the public never supports implementation. Formally, let q max solve
In equilibrium, q 2 [0; q max ].
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Proposition 1 captures the idea that since the public is rational and discounts biased information, the government has a strong incentive to preserve a minimum level of trust in o¢ cial communications. Note in fact that if the bias in information was so large that the public paid no attention to the report, then the government would be better o¤ by not biasing the information since that would minimize the chance of mistakes. Thus q > q max cannot be part of an equilibrium.
The next proposition characterizes equilibrium play. We focus on the behavior of the government since it is obvious that the public will support implementation if and only if both signals are positive (andmax ).
Proposition 2. In the full disclosure scenario with observable bias, let q T be the equilibrium level of bias. Three cases must be distinguished.
(i) If the con ‡ict of interest between the government and the public is small ( C w B > 1 2 ), then the government is always disciplined by public opinion and q T = 0.
(ii) If the con ‡ict of interest is intermediate (
), then the government is always disciplined by public opinion and q T = min fq ; q max g > 0, where
(iii) If the con ‡ict of interest is large ( T Gov 1 2 ), the equilibrium level of bias is either 0 or min fq ; q max g. If q T = 0, then the government is not disciplined by public opinion. If q T = min fq ; q max g, instead, discipline obtains.
Cases (i) and (ii) deal with situations where electoral concerns are so strong (T Gov > 1 2 ) that the government always selects the policy the public deems appropriate. Nevertheless, 11 One can easily show that because C w 2 ( The most interesting case arises when the con ‡ict of interest between the government and the public is large (case (iii)). Two di¤erent scenarios emerge, depending on whether q is above or below a cuto¤ pointq. 13 As usual, the relevant case to consider is when the report is mixed (e.g., ( ; ?) q ). If q is 'small' (i.e., belowq), after observing ( ; ?) q the government feels relatively con…dent that the signal is genuine. As a result, it will implement the project even if the public supports the status quo. By contrast, if q is 'big' (aboveq), then the likelihood that the signal is fake is so large that the government will choose not to implement the project (which is what the public wants). Thus, as shown in Proposition 2(iii), equilibria can either be characterized by little bias in information and no discipline, or by a large bias in information and discipline. Intuitively, as the bias in information grows, the government becomes more concerned about mistakes and therefore more cautious when implementing its ex ante preferred policy. Thus, by inducing the government to change its optimal decision rule in the direction that the public wants, biased information e¤ectively helps more closely align the preferences of the government and the public.
These e¤ects can be shown pictorially as follows. Let E( relevant payo¤ when q >q.
(the second region obviously does not exist ifmax ). We use E( G nd ) as a counterfactual because if q = 0, then the government is not disciplined by public opinion. Note that since E( G nd ) is independent of q, any bias that maximizes q T L will also maximize the government's expected payo¤. . This problem exhibits an interesting nonconcavity. Because of this nonconcavity, as stated in Proposition 2(iii) the optimum size of the bias is either zero or minfq ; q max g, where q = arg max
. In Figure 4 .1 the equilibrium bias in information is q . However, as electoral concerns E become less important, policymakers become less concerned about public opinion and equilibrium bias drops. For instance, in the example in Figure 2 , it su¢ ces to take E = 0:1 for q T to be zero. Obviously, q T will be close to its upper bound q max when private bene…ts B are large.
Can the Public Bene…t from Biased Information?
The possibility that manipulations could increase discipline as highlighted by Proposition 2(iii) suggests that a commitment to never manipulate the information may sometimes reduce citizen welfare. To explore this possibility, we evaluate citizen welfare when electoral concerns are weak (T Gov
2
). As for the government's payo¤, two cases must be distinguished, depending on whether q 7q. Let E(U q d ) (E(U q nd )) be the public's expected payo¤ when the government is (not) disciplined by public opinion and the size of the bias
where (4.3) measures citizen welfare when q <q, and (4.4) measures citizen welfare when q >q. In both cases we use E(U However, when the bias in information is so large that the government changes its decision rule, the public's payo¤ 'jumps up'. To see this, compute . Note that since the value of discipline is strictly positive at q ' 0, if citizens could achieve discipline with little bias in information, they would prefer this situation to one in which manipulations are impossible. The example in Figures 2 and 3 illustrates this possibility.
The next result tell us when a commitment not to manipulate the information always bene…ts the public and when it may not.
Proposition 3. In a disclosure environment, a commitment not to manipulate the information can hurt the public when electoral concerns are weak ( T Gov
). Such a commitment however always bene…ts the public when electoral concerns are strong ( T Gov >
).
14 When q <q, the only e¤ect that is present is the greater chance that the incorrect decison may be taken. This happens when ( ; ) q is observed but the genuine signals would have been (?; ?) G (which occurs with probability 1 2 q 2 V ), and when ( ; ?) q or (?; ) q is observed but the genuine signals would have been (?; ?) G (which occurs with probability (1 q) qV ). Hence the two negative terms in equation (4.3).
Proposition 3 shows that voters may prefer to tolerate some bias in information (optimally chosen by the government) in order to more closely align the government's interests with their own. This e¤ect only exists when the government is not very responsive to public opinion, suggesting that the bene…ts of having an independent bureaucracy should be greater in more mature democracies. The intuition for the result is that as the information becomes more biased toward the government's initial disposition, policymakers also become increasingly concerned about forgeries and choose to implement the project less often. The example in Figure 3 shows that the bene…ts of discipline can outweigh the losses caused by poor information (citizen welfare at q = q is in fact greater than citizen welfare at q = 0). Thus the public could be worse o¤ if the government committed not to manipulate the information.
Disclosure with Unobservable Bias
We now turn to a scenario where the report is disclosed but the public ignores the extent to which the signals have been distorted. The analysis of this case is considerably more complex than the one carried out in the previous subsections because pure strategy equilibria no longer exists when the con ‡ict of interest between the government and the public is very large. Nevertheless, we can show the following.
Proposition 4. The key qualitative results of the model survive when the size of the bias is unobservable and must therefore be inferred in equilibrium. Speci…cally:
1. In every equilibrium of the unobservable bias scenario the choice of q (possibly made by randomizing among the elements of a set Q) must be such that citizens either support implementation or are indi¤erent between w or n when the signals are positive.
2. There exist equilibria of the unobservable bias scenario such that the bias in information is strictly positive (thus manipulations can occur in equilibrium).
3. Furthermore, the public may be worse o¤ if the government commits not to manipulate the information.
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibria with observable and unobservable bias share similar qualitative features. In both cases, the government has an incentive to manipulate the information but such tendency is constrained by the fact that voters discount biased information. In the example in Figures 2 and 3 , equilibrium play is una¤ected by the fact that q may not be observable. This is becausemax and can therefore be sustained as a (pure strategy) equilibrium. 15 Thus a commitment not to manipulate the information may hurt the public even when the bias of the government agency is not observable.
Secrecy
The previous section studied the case where the government must truthfully disclose all the information. This section considers the case where the government commits not to disclose any information ('secrecy'). Throughout we assume that q is unobservable since it must be di¢ cult if not impossible to assess the reliability of the government's sources if no information is released. However, the government policy is observable and this information can be used to update beliefs.
To characterize equilibrium play, more notation is needed. Let (q; (s q )) be a strategy for the government, where (s q ) is a probability distribution over policies, conditional on s q . Let denote a mixed strategy for the public. Suppose that after observing policy p 2 fw; ng the public believes the government is playing strategy (q p ;~ p ). Let (p;q p ;~ p ) denote the public's optimal strategy given these beliefs. 16 Loosely speaking, a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of this game is a strategy pro…le (q ; ; ) and a set of beliefs such that each player's strategy maximizes his payo¤ given his beliefs and the other player's strategy, and beliefs are formed according to (q ; ; ) and Bayes'rule. If an action is not played in equilibrium, no restriction is imposed on beliefs.
Our …rst result shows that secrecy is e¤ective at protecting the integrity of the decisionmaking process.
Proposition 5. In the nondisclosure scenario, suppose that after observing policy p the 15 In such equilibrium, the public conjectures that q is the equilibrium level of bias. Furthermore, since q < q max , the public supports implementation if and only if the signals ( ; ) are observed. Given the public's decision rule, it is optimal for the government to set q = q , even if q can be chosen among all q 2 [0; 1], not just those smaller or equal than q max (this follows from the concavity of q d;nd and inspection of Figure 4 .1). 16 The optimal strategy is obtained by …rst computing the probability that W is the true state of the world (say P ) given d, and then choosing w or n depending on whether P ? C w (a nondegenerate mixed strategy is played only if P = C w ). Clearly, to compute P (via Bayes'rule), the public needs to have some beliefs about (q; ). public holds beliefs (q p ;~ p ). Given (q p ;~ p ), let (q) be the maximum expected payo¤ that the government can achieve when the size of the bias is q. Then (0) (q).
Proposition 5 provides a strong rationale for restricting attention to equilibria where q = 0. It says that for any given belief that the public may hold, knowing more (q = 0)
cannot hurt the government. This result is intuitive but not obvious since in games more information is not necessarily bene…cial, not even for the player who holds it (see, e.g., Bassan, Scarsini, Zamir, 1997) . However, as Kamien, Tauman and Zamir (1990) have pointed out, "it is not the information itself that harms player 1 [the informed player] but the fact that player 2 knew that he had it" (p. 133). In our case, q is not publicly known.
Of course, in equilibrium voters …nd out q, but for any given belief they might hold, the government has the incentive to acquire more information. It is this incentive that drives Proposition 5.
17
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium of this game. ), the project is never implemented (discipline).
), there are cases when the project is always implemented and cases when the project is not implemented with positive probability (partial discipline).
(iii) If the con ‡ict of interest is large ( T Gov 1 2
), the project is always implemented (no discipline).
17 The result also relies on all q's being equally costly. Note in fact that if hiring unbiased bureaucrats was prohibitively costly, the result would not hold. Proposition 5 should therefore be interpreted as a comparison of gross expected payo¤s.
Thus, as the government becomes more disposed toward the project, the likelihood that the government is disciplined by public opinion decreases. More interestingly, the comparison between Propositions 2 and 6 reveals that when the agency is nonindependent, the choice between transparency and secrecy involves a tradeo¤ between manipulations and discipline. Secrecy is in fact e¤ective at protecting the integrity of the decisionmaking process (q = 0), which is often not the case under transparency. On the other hand, transparency ensures that government is always disciplined by public opinion when electoral concerns are strong (T Gov > 1 2 ) and sometimes also when they are weak (T Gov
2
). By contrast, in the nondisclosure scenario the government is not always disciplined when electoral concerns are strong and is never disciplined when electoral concerns are weak. This lack of discipline is due to the fact that without the report voters cannot …gure out exactly why a speci…c decision was taken. Suppose in fact that the government decides to implement the project. This decision could be based on strong evidence or mixed evidence. Without knowing the contents of the report, voters cannot punish the government for the latter decision only. As a result, the government is less accountable and thus less responsive to public desires. It is simple to provide examples where, because of this tradeo¤ between manipulations and accountability, either transparency or secrecy can be optimal from the citizens'point of view.
Independence of the Government Agency and Optimal Constitutions
The previous analysis has assumed that the government can easily interfere with the workings of the government agency in charge of producing the report. This is a reasonable In this section we analyze the implications of granting full independence to the government agencies in charge of collecting and evaluating pre-decision information. Formally, we model the creation of an independent agency as a commitment not to manipulate the information. Thus, if an agency is insulated from political pressure, it will carry out its job as objectively as possible. We begin by considering the choice between transparency and secrecy when the agency in charge of collecting the information is independent.
Proposition 7. Suppose the government agency is independent (i.e., q = 0). Then transparency always dominates secrecy from the citizens'viewpoint.
The intuition for this proposition is simple: If the information cannot be manipulated, only accountability matters, and transparency is in the citizens' interest. More interestingly, we can consider the case where both the disclosure policy and the degree of independence of the government agency can be chosen to maximize citizen welfare. Four possibilities arise. These possibilities (or 'constitutions') are listed in Table I . A constitution is said to be optimal if it maximizes citizen welfare. Proposition 8 characterizes optimal constitutions.
Proposition 8. An optimal constitution always involves transparency, but may or may not require the government agency to be independent.
This result is quite surprising. In a setting where disclosure of information creates incentives for manipulation, we …nd strong support for transparency but only quali…ed support for bureaucratic independence. Transparency always dominates secrecy because if secrecy is socially optimal when the agency is nonindependent, then transparency and bureaucratic independence together always increases citizen welfare. The chief advantage of secrecy-unbiased information-can in fact more e¤ectively be achieved by insulating the government agency from political pressure. We also …nd that granting independence to the agency is not necessarily in the citizens'interest. This is because biased information makes the government less responsive to information supporting its ex ante favored policy, thus reducing the agency con ‡ict between the government and the public. 18 By contrast, the standard argument in favor of political control of bureaucrats emphasizes the risk that they may have di¤erent preferences from those of the general public (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 2004) . Betts (2004) also argues that, at least in the case of intelligence, a close connection between the President and the head of the agency may be preferable to the lack of such a connection because the risks of insulation and unresponsiveness often outweight those of politicization. Clearly the present model provides a di¤erent rationale for the optimality of nonindependent agencies.
Voluntary Disclosure
The notion of transparency discussed so far postulates that the government must share all its information with the public. This assumption could describe a situation where Open Government legislation is particularly e¤ective. However, in reality policymakers often have some discretion as to whether release information. This section considers a variant of the model where the government cannot commit to any disclosure rule: disclosure is voluntary. We show that voluntary disclosure e¤ectively results in all the information being disclosed. Indeed, since information is hard in this model, the logic of Milgrom's (1981) 'unraveling'result applies.
To see this, suppose that q is observable andmax . 19 Furthermore, suppose beliefs are 'skeptical' in the sense that voters expect the government to disclose favorable information (that is, signals) and interpret lack of disclosure as evidence that the signal was negative. In this setup, the government has a strict incentive to disclose very favorable information (i.e., ( ; ) signals). Suppose in fact that both signals are positive. If these signals were not disclosed, voters would not support implementation. Clearly the government would be better o¤ by disclosing the information and then implementing the project with the support of the public. Note that whether or not the signals are disclosed when they are not both positive is inconsequential since voters can infer that at least one signal is negative and will therefore not support implementation. Thus the equilibrium 18 However, when a nonindependent agency is optimal, if the public could choose the optimal bias in information, it would chooseq minfq ; q max g, not minfq ; q max g (see Figure 4 .2, and note thatmax for the nonindependent agency to be optimal). Thus there is a sense in which the equilibrium level of politicization of the agency is always too high compared to the socially optimal level. 19 A similar argument applies when q is unobservable.
with voluntary disclosure is payo¤-equivalent to that of the full disclosure model.
Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a model where the government cares about how its actions are perceived by the public and therefore has an incentive to "…x the evidence" around its ex ante favored policy. We use the model to study how di¤erent disclosure rules and the degree of independence of the government agencies in charge of collecting information a¤ect the quality of decision-making. The most interesting results emerge when both instruments are chosen to maximize citizen welfare. We …nd that secrecy is always dominated by transparency but that granting independence to the agency is not necessarily socially optimal.
The last result is due to the fact that biased information has a surprisingly bene…cial side: For given evidence, it makes the government more reluctant to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus e¤ectively reducing the con ‡ict of interest between the government and the public.
The model could be extended in several directions. One interesting extension would be to allow the government to always enjoy an informational advantage compared to the public. For instance, the government may be able to keep a third, informative signal secret (a 'con…dential report'). We conjecture that the existence of a con…dential report would exacerbate the government's tendency to manipulate publicly available information. 20 However, so long as there is loss of information in manipulating public information, the qualitative results of this paper would still hold. The model also posits that di¤erent disclosure environments do not a¤ect per se the quality of information. However, one of the main virtues of transparency is that independent analysts can verify government information and thinking about an issue. That would not only curb manipulation, but also reduce the risk of 'innocent'mistakes. Thirdly, the present analysis neglects the important role of bureaucrats'incentives. In the case of performance targets in health care, for instance, government and hospitals all have an incentive to in ‡ate performance …gures.
This need not always be the case. Studying how politicians and bureaucrats could both be made more accountable and hence responsive to public desire is an exciting direction for future research.
Appendix A: The Government's Payo¤
In this appendix we explicitly derive expressions for the government's payo¤ and q T H and q T L . We omit the derivation of the public's payo¤, which is simpler and could be obtained in a similar fashion.
Strong Electoral Concerns (T
(the subscript d denotes that the government is disciplined by public opinion). De…ne V 2 + (1 ) 2 = Pr(( ; ) G ) + Pr((?; ?) G ) and R 2 (1 ) = 2 Pr(( ; ?) G ). We have
. We can rewrite the …rst line of (A2) as
, the second line as
and the third line as
It follows that
Heuristically, q T H can also be derived as follows. Suppose that the genuine signals were mixed but ( ; ) q was observed instead (this occurs with probability 2 Pr(( ; ) q j (?; ) G ) Pr((?; ) G ) = qR). The expected payo¤ to the government would then be (w; w j (?; ) G ). Note that if q = 0, this payo¤ would have been (n; n j (?; ) G ).
Thus the net gain from setting q > 0 in this case is (w; w j (?; ) G ) (n; n j (?; ) G ) = 
, so here we only need to derive E( q nd ). Note that the only di¤erence between E( q d ) and E( q nd ) is that in the latter case, when the signals are mixed, the government implement the project. The second line of (A2) must therefore be replaced by . Thus
Using the fact that
we obtain q nd;nd = qRE
1 2
). Two cases must be distinguished, depending on whether the government implements the project when the signals are mixed. (It is clearly optimal for the government to implement the project when the signals are ( ; ).) If the project is implemented when the signal are mixed, we have E(
Simple algebra yields
(see (A3)). Thus q > q max cannot be optimal. If instead the project is not implemented when the signal are mixed, we have E(
Again, we have that
Thus setting q > q max cannot be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that sincemax by Proposition 1, the public will always support implementation when the signals are positive. Furthermore, the government prefers n to w when both signals are negative because of Assumption 2.
We begin with the case when T Gov > 1 2
(cases (i) and (ii)). In this case the government never implements the project when the evidence is mixed. Note in fact that Gov = Pr(W j( ; ?) q ) 1 2
and by assumption 1 2 < T Gov . Since Gov < T Gov , Lemma 1 shows that the government will choose not to implement the project.
To characterize the equilibrium level of bias, let E( q d ) denote the expected payo¤ to the government when the size of the bias is q and the government is disciplined by public opinion (hence the subscript d). The government will choose q to maximize E( q d ) subject to the constraint q 2 [0; q max ]. However, it is more instructive to compare E(
, the payo¤ that the government would get if it was disciplined by public opinion but there was no distortion in information. De…ne
) is independent of q, the optimal bias in information can be computed by maximizing q T H subject to q 2 [0; q max ]. In Appendix A we showed that
This proves parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2. To prove part (iii), suppose that T Gov 1 2 . Two cases can arise, depending on whether the bias in information q is small or large. In both cases the government implements the project when s q = ( ; ) and selects the status quo when s q = (?; ?). The distinction arises when the evidence is mixed. Letq solve q = T Gov (this requires
it is optimal for the government to implement the project even though the public supports the status quo. In fact, C w (1 q ) + B E > C n q implies q > T Gov (which implies q <q). Conversely, if q >q, the government will not implement the project.
Now let E( q nd ) be the expected payo¤ to the government when the size of the bias is q and the government is not disciplined by public opinion. For T Gov 
T Gov and 
, thenq = 1 and the result is trivially true sincemax .)
and one can easily verify that
Simple algebra also yields
This concludes the proof of Lemma B1. Proposition 2(iii) easily follows from Lemma B1.
Proof of Proposition 3. In Section 4.1 we constructed an example where electoral concerns are weak (T Gov 1 2
) and a commitment not to manipulate the information hurts the public (see Figure 3 ). Here we show that when electoral concerns are strong (T Gov > 1 2 ), it is always in the public's interest to set q = 0. Let E(U q d ) be the public's expected payo¤ when the government is disciplined by public opinion and the size of the bias in information is q. One can easily show that
From (B1) it is clear that if
citizen welfare is maximized when q = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The …rst part of the proposition follows from the fact that if the public never supports implementation, then it is optimal for the government to set q = 0 with probability one to minimize at least the chance of mistakes (see Proposition 1). This leads to a contradiction since q = 0 is inconsistent with the fact that citizens never support implementation. To prove part 2 and 3, consider the case when T Gov > 1 2
and suppose for the moment that the public supports implementation with probability one if (and only if) the signals are ( ; ). This implies that the government faces the same problem as in the observable bias scenario, with the di¤erence however that now q can take any value between 0 and 1, not just between 0 and q max . Since the government's payo¤ is given by ~ 
The optimum q can clearly be found by maximizing (B2). Note that if
2). It follows from Proposition 2(iii) that the optimum size of the bias is either 0 or min fq ; 1g.
In both cases, the key issue is whether it makes sense for the public to support implementation when ( ; ) is observed. If T Gov > Proof. We prove the result for the case when T Gov 1 2
. The case when T Gov > 1 2 is similar. 21 For the sake of brevity, we omit the derivation of the public's payo¤. However, one can heuristically obtain (B1) as follows. Note that biased information a¤ects citizen welfare only when the genuine signals would have been negative or mixed but ( ; ) is observed instead. These are the cases in fact when the government policy switches from n to w. To obtain (B1), note that these events occur with probability 1 2 q 2 V and qR and yield a welfare loss of C w and C w 1 2 , respectively. 22 In the nongeneric case where more than one q maximizes ~ q T H , we take the smallest one. T L > q max q e , beliefs will not be consistent with the play of the game. Suppose therefore that q e > q max . Since in this case the public never supports w, it is optimal for the government to set q = 0 (Proposition 1). Beliefs are again inconsistent with the play of the game since q e > q max but the actual bias is 0. Thus pure strategy Nash equilibria do not exist ifq T L > q max . This completes the proof of Lemma B2.
When the conditions in Lemma B2 are met, equilibrium play is the same regardless of whether q is observable or not. This is the case for the example in Figures 2 and 3 since q < q max . Thus the partial characterization of Lemma B2 su¢ ces to prove parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 4. A characterization of equilibrium play when the conditions of Lemma B2 do not hold necessarily involves mixed strategies and is available from the author upon request.
Proof of Proposition 5. (This proof is a simple variant of a standard result in decision theory. See Marschak and Radner, 1972, pp. 65-67.) Suppose that after observing policy p, the public believes that the government is playing a strategy (q p ;~ p ). Let (p;q p ;~ p ) denote the public's optimal mixed strategy given these beliefs. Furthermore, let f ; ?g and fW; N g. Suppose that the government selects q > 0. (Sinceq p may or may not be equal to q, this need not be an equilibrium.) The best the government can achieve is (q) = X . We therefore need mixed strategies. The indi¤erence condition for the government is C n 1 2 = C w 1 1 2 + B zE =) z = 1=2 (C w B) E :
The indi¤erence condition for the public is Pr(W j w; s) = C w , where Pr(W j w; s) is the probability that S = W after observing p = w given that the government plays w with probability one if ( ; ) G , with probability s if the signals are mixed, and with probability zero if (?; ?) G . Using Bayes'rule Pr(W j w; s) = 2 + sR V + 2 sR = C w =) s = 2 C w V R (2C w 1) = G + C w 2r (C w 1=2) .
One can easily prove that^ < T P implies s < 1 and that T Gov > 1 2
and C w B < 1 2 imply z < 1.
To conclude the proof, note that if the government plays w with positive probability when the signals are mixed, then it must play w with probability one when ( ; ) G .
Proof of Proposition 7. Obvious.
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that constitutions III and IV yield the same welfare since secrecy and the independence of the government agency both imply that q = 0 in equilibrium. Since constitution III is dominated by I, we can therefore conclude that disclosure is always a feature of an optimal constitution. Finally, Proposition 3 shows that either constitution I or II can be optimal.
